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In 1985 The Smiths twittered as merry as larks: ‘‘From the ice-age to the dole-age,
There is but one concern, I have just discovered: Some girls are bigger than
others…’’. Good song, wrong theory. There is more than one single concern that
drives the evolution of our species—or so Kim Sterelny argues convincingly in his
rich and lucid book The Evolved Apprentice.
The Evolved Apprentice offers nothing short of a theory of human nature by
providing an account of human evolution from within natural science, yet from a
philosophical point of view. Ever since the times of Aristotle, one of the core
projects of philosophy concerns the question of human nature. The traditional
response of philosophers to the problem of human nature has been an affirmation of
the anthropological difference. The anthropological difference defines a quality that
distinguishes all human beings from all non-human beings, particularly from all
non-human animals; moreover, the anthropological difference is supposed to
explain the unique features of the human mind. According to the classical definition,
humans are rational animals, with rationality or reason being the key quality that
marks off the human kind and the human mind. One of the first philosophers to
break with the traditional approach was David Hume. In a remarkable footnote in
the section ‘‘Of the reason of animals’’ of his Enquiry concerning human
understanding, Hume cheerfully notes that the obvious difference between the
cognitive competences of humans and animals is not due to one key dissimilarity, as
Descartes and Locke claimed, but rather to the interplay of many, mostly gradual
differences (Hume 1999, 167).
The contemporary answer of the philosophical naturalist to the question of
human nature has it that human beings are a species of animals and part of nature.
That’s how things stand apparently. Yet, humans are not ‘‘just another species of
large mammal’’—as Sterelny aptly puts it in his forerunner book Thought in a
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Hostile World (Sterelny 2003). Indeed, we are very peculiar beasts, peculiar in ways
relevant to evolutionary theory. In contrast to our closest relatives, there is
something special in the human evolutionary trajectory, since modern chimpanzees
very much resemble their ancestors five million years ago, but we don’t.
However, and perhaps surprisingly, most contemporary models of hominin
evolution are still very much in the grip of the time-honoured anthropological
difference, as they represent attempts to demonstrate in numerous ways that the
evolutionary peculiarity of human life and the human mind follows from one single
key adaptive breakthrough. In contrast to Aristotle and along with Hume, Sterelny is
deeply sceptical about ‘key-breakthrough’ models of hominin evolution. The model
he offers instead strongly emphasizes positive feedback loops among different
features of hominin life that were novel to, or greatly amplified in, our lineage. We
are, thus, faced with more than just one key feature: ‘‘There is no master adaptation
whose origin explains the rest.’’ (p. 20).
More precisely, Sterelny offers a challenge and a viable alternative to the
‘standard picture’ of human evolution. According to this picture, human evolution
was primarily driven by social rather than environmental selection pressures; the
fittest among our ancestors were those who were successful at securing the fruits of
cooperation while avoiding its costs. The social game of assessing motives for
cooperation and improving the means for cheating fuelled the evolution of our large
brains. Likewise, and importantly, the standard picture claims that evolution created
an architecture of domain-specific mental modules containing rich innate informa-
tion that allows humans to solve complex adaptive problems without effort and
wasting time. This is the much-debated massive modularity thesis. The evolutionary
argument for this thesis has it that selection would have favoured minds that come
prewired with the sort of information that makes them more successful at solving
adaptive problems. The standard picture, thus, focuses on adapted minds, based on
two well-known approaches from the philosophy of mind: nativism and individ-
ualism. Since the human mind is supposed to contain preinstalled, task-specific
information, the standard picture takes a nativist stance; and, since the cognitive
power of the human mind is explained by extra-large brains and task-specific mental
modules, the picture is unfailingly an expression of individualism.
While Sterelny accepts the tenets of the standard picture that social cooperation
has been crucial for hominin evolution and that many routine tasks our ancestors
faced are cognitively demanding, he rejects the idea that prewired modules can do
the trick of effortlessly solving complex problems, and he claims that the problem of
managing cooperation is misunderstood. Against nativism, Sterelny’s empiricist and
externalist model of human evolution holds that humans evolved to become adept
social learners, and against individualism he claims that human cognitive
competence is a collective achievement. This achievement not only involves strict
dependence on others, it likewise involves strict dependence on our environment
being organized in ways that strongly enhance our mental capacities. In short,
adapted minds are fine, but insufficient. What one needs in order to be more than
just another species of large mammals are adapted environments.
Here is an important example of a positive feedback loop. Our ancestors have
both created and responded to a unique foraging mode, a mode that is both social
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and involves certain effects on hominin social environments. At some point in the
human past (in the Pleistocene), climatic changes encouraged a shift to a new mode
of exploiting resources in the environment, namely, cooperative foraging. This
altered mode involves the cooperative hunting of large game. In turn, it therefore
entails at least three different elements, namely, rich ecological information about
the game and the local ecology, flexible cooperation, and adequate hunting
technology. Ecological information and technology requires intergenerational
transmission by social learning. It just seems most implausible that both ecological
knowledge and technical skills could have been invented from scratch in each
generation. Moreover, the relevant information and skills are both much too variable
and too specific to be innately stored. Better be behaviourally flexible if you go for
large and dangerous game.
The general problem with the standard model is its massive underrating of the
ecological and social variability in early human environments. Innate information
doesn’t get you very far when you’re faced with a constant string of new problems.
Sterelny calls this ‘‘the problem of novelty’’. He takes it to be the central problem
that needs to be solved by an account of human evolution. The problem of novelty is
the problem of designing minds that are flexible enough to adapt themselves to
whatever tight spot or embarrassment of riches they should happen to find
themselves in. Learning solves this problem; stores of innate information don’t.
So far, so good. However, if you are not under the spell of the innate information
idea due to the magic charm of the poverty of stimulus curse, it doesn’t come as a
big surprise that learning is a key feature in human evolution and—come to think of
it—in the evolution of other species, too. Sterelny offers a specific proposal of how
our ancestors acquired the bulk of their cultural knowledge: the Apprentice
Learning Model (ALM)—hence the title of the book. ALM is introduced and
developed in the first two chapters and refined throughout the remainder of the
book. Chapter 3 tackles the question of why Neanderthals went extinct and why the
human lineage took such a long time to become behaviourally modern. In rough
outline, Sterelny claims in anti-individualistic manner that the extinction of
Neanderthals does not rely on intrinsic differences just between the Neanderthals
and Sapiens species, but rather on individual group interactions. Chapter 4 provides
an account of the cooperation syndrome typical of humans and defends his model
against various alternatives. The most notable example is the Grandmother
Hypothesis, which withstands the idea that human evolution is basically driven
by cooperation and learning, and explains typical human life history changes as a
side effect of increased body size. (as The Smiths already knew: ‘‘Some girl’s
mothers are bigger than Other girl’s mothers’’). Chapters 5 and 6 treat the problem
of free riders and discuss different strategies of cooperative units in dealing with
deception and defection. Chapter 7 is then concerned with the cultural evolution of
norms and criticises the basic analogy exploited by defenders of moral nativism,
namely, the weak analogy between linguistic knowledge and moral knowledge.
Faithful to his anti-nativist and anti-individualist stance, Sterelny accepts the
grounding of moral cognition in biology, yet refrains from invoking domain-specific
information to account for it. The final chapter critically takes up the suggestion that
our tendency toward strong reciprocity might be explained by some form of group
How Evolution Made Humans Unique 237
123
selection. Instead of concentrating on the rich and convincing applications of ALM,
however, let’s focus in the following on key features of ALM itself.
Apprentice learning is defined as supervised and organized trial and error, that is,
learning which takes place in an environment seeded with props and other cognitive
tools. It requires neither explicit teaching nor learning institutions. The standard
picture supposedly not only underestimates the degree of variability in early human
environments, it also misjudges the degree to which the informational demands of
learning can be offloaded onto the environment. According to ALM, humans excel
in a special sort of niche construction, namely epistemic engineering. We are good
at creating social and physical environments that make learning tasks easier to bear.
Generally speaking, human evolution consists in human responses to selective
environments which earlier humans have built.
According to an understanding of heritability in terms of population genetics, a
trait is heritable if variation in the trait can be explained by variation in the genes, as
opposed to variation in the environment. Heritability in this sense is thought to be
mandatory for natural selection to take place. Now, many important human traits are
not heritable in this way, since they vary across and within cultures and
environments. From a more general point of view, however, what is required for
natural selection to take place is that a trait be robustly transmitted, such that the
variant in the parent tends to reappear reliably in the offspring. As Eva Jablonka and
Marion Lamb have argued, however, there are other inheritance systems besides the
genetic system. They identify, for example, four types of inheritance systems
(genetic, epigenetic, behavioural, and symbol-based), each of which provides
variations on which natural selection can act (Jablonka and Lamb 2005). Similarly,
Sterelny has argued before—building on the work of Kevin Laland and others on
niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003)—that natural selection can act on
traits even if they vary with the environment rather than with the genes, as long as
environments can themselves be transmitted down a lineage (Sterelny 2003, 2007).
And this feat can be achieved by niche construction—a process whereby living
beings, through their activities, modify their own niches and, thereby, transform
selection pressures (Sterelny 2010).
So, an apprentice in an adult workshop has access to tools, working models of
tools, to raw materials, to any number of intermediate stages in the process from raw
materials to finished products, and to adults working on different tasks. The
epistemically engineered world of an apprentice is therefore also a richly structured
learning environment, endowed with salient features where trial and error learning
is far off from random search in a homogenous space of possibilities. In other
words, this environment is not poor in stimulation. Once a stimulating learning
environment is in place (perhaps it just starts with generously tolerating youngsters
who are curiously hanging around in adult work spaces), further learning would
increase the probability that an innovation in one generation would establish itself
also in the next generation. The intergenerational flow of technical expertise would
then elaborate upon this primitive starting point by building up an apprentice
system. As tools became more important in adult practices, children were exploring
a world increasingly littered with raw materials, by-products of tool making, or
partly constructed tools. In the course of this development, expertise was acquired
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and exercised based on some very rich environmental support. The apprentices
would have had opportunities for observational learning, receiving advice and
seeing demonstrations, engaging in guided trials, and embarking on appropriately
assigned tasks. The pay-off for the adult practitioner, of course, would have been an
offloading of basic or simple tasks onto the apprentice. Now, learning takes a unique
form in our species, since we can accumulate ‘cognitive capital’, and the way we
managed the accumulation of cognitive capital is, according to Sterelny, crucial for
human evolution. Importantly, this accumulation depends on the construction and
stabilisation of special learning environments, that is, it depends on epistemic
engineering, rather than genetic transformation.
In sum, the central point of ALM is that cognitive competence and skills develop
in an environment adaptively organised to make relevant information ready and
available. Cognition is socially and environmentally supported. Improvements in
the bandwidth, fidelity, and flexibility of apprentice learning all stem from changes
in the coevolving, interconnected parameters of our capacities for coordination and
information-pooling in structured environments, rather than from one single key
breakthrough in evolution.
Sterelny’s argument is both scientifically and philosophically informed. Although
the philosophical aspect might not be obvious to all readers, the empiricist, anti-
individualist, and externalist angle which Sterelny takes on the question of human
evolution—and thus the good old problem of human nature—is certainly informed
by the most interesting trends and debates of contemporary philosophy of mind. The
range of research and resources Sterelny incorporates, discusses, examines,
assesses, and puts to scrutiny is most impressive. There are informed and elaborated
references to an extraordinary wealth of distinct research domains. What is the
book’s most convincing aspect is perhaps the integration of this wealth of research
into a relatively simple, yet solid explanatory model.
The Evolved Apprentice is a serious challenge for defenders of the ‘standard
picture’ and it offers a helpful framework to philosophers of mind, philosophers of
biology and researchers working on human evolution, archeology, or paleoanthro-
pology. It is food for thought for scientists working in the humanities and the social
sciences who are interested in questions of human nature and cultural transmission, not
least since many working in the humanities are still in the grip of a picture according to
which evolutionary accounts of human nature and cultural transmission amount to
some form of crude genetic determinism (Marks 2012). Sterelny’s book should not
only be seen as a valuable contribution to the on-going debate concerning human
evolution, but also as a guiding model for how to achieve a multidisciplinary synthesis
from a philosophical point of view when advocating a naturalistic empiricism.
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